Raoul M. Cola
College of Public Administration
University of the Philippines

ABSTRACT

During the 16 July 1990 earthquake, households and communities immediately responded to its Impact to ensure their survival and the restoration of their former lifeways. The response mainly made use of available resources (material and non-material) and group (kinship, neighborhood or community based) effort. However, the response was conceived and implemented in a haphazard and trial-and-error manner.

One of the source of divisive competition and conflicts at that time was the absence of defined procedures for households in assistance procurement. Although initially they relied on their community leaders who secured assistance from various government and non-government sources, many households preempted their leaders and other households by directly soliciting assistance outside their communities. Government and non-government units based outside the community failed to respond immediately to the situation.

Communities evolved a distribution system of relief assistance based on their own concept of fairness. This distribution system had built-in accountability procedures so that short-cutting it invited suspicion of pilferage. But instead of working within this system, some government and non-government units directly delivered relief goods to the households. Doing so upset the functioning of the existing distribution system and resulted to a number of undesirable consequences.

In the absence of outside assistance, the survival and the normalization of the lives of the households and their community hinged not only on the household (such as houses) and community (such as roads) properties spared by the disaster but also on their natural resources. As a result of the breakdown of the distribution system of goods and services, the households became more dependent on the resources in their natural environment. The communities who had these resources and knew how to use these had greater chances of surviving the disaster even without any outside assistance.

It is apparent that any effective natural disaster mitigation program should be built around the community rather than on higher government units and on non-government units. The effort of these units should only supplement rather than supplant that of the community. Making the community the centerpiece of a disaster mitigation program is borne out of the realization that government and non-government units, particularly in the developing countries, have very limited capability to assist afected communities. Given the poverty prevailing in developing countries, outside assistance if given outside the context of the concept of self-help, readily nurtures dependency among affected communities by supplanting local capability.

INTRODUCTION

The impact of the twin earthquakes in Northern Luzon last 16 June 1990 and the manner the government response was organized brought into focus the urgent need to formulate a systematic disaster preparedness and mitigation measures. The measures are aimed at reducing not only the risk ref disaster but also the duration and scope of its impact. The need for such measures has long been felt because of the high vulnerability of the Country to natural disaster. It ranked second as having the most number of such disasters between 1960 and 1981 among 53 countries surveyed1 . These countries had an average of one disaster per year white the Philippines had four, for each disaster, the Philippines lost an average of 203 human lives and an unestimated cost to the economy.

Although the physical event comprising the disaster cannot be prevented, its impact call be minimized by disaster preparedness and mitigation measures. However, such measures have to be based on two types of research-based information: the nature of the physical event spurring the disaster and the human behavior related to the disaster, This study is carried out to contribute to the provision of information of the letter type2. It captures aspects of’ the disaster-related behavior of residents in the earthquake affected areas as seen in two settings — in the household and in the community. This behavior is reviewed and lessons which may serve as input in the preparation of a disaster preparedness and mitigation plan are subsequently drawn.

OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The objective of the study is to know how the residents in Northern Luzon reacted to the impact of the earthquake both as members of the household and the community. To pursue such objective, the study will to answer the following questions:

1. What was the level of awareness of the residents with regards to the geologic hazards in their communities?
   

2. What actions did the residents take at the household and community levels to cope with the impact of these hazards when these occurred?
   

3. What household and community resources were tapped to cope with such impact and how were these used?
   

4. What types of assistance were sought by the residents from outside their household and community and how were these secured and distributed?

To answer these questions, the study reconstructs the strategies implemented by the households and communities to ensure their survival in a disaster situation and to hasten the normalization of their day-to-day living patterns. The reconstruction enables the study to identify the effects of each strategy and the problems encountered in their implementation. In consideration of these effects and problems, the study sorts out these strategies which worked and should serve as basis for a household and community-based disaster preparedness and mitigation measures.

METHODOLOGY

The study used two main data collection strategies: sample survey and key informant interview. The survey was conducted among the households in the provinces of Benguet, La Union and Pangasinan where the earthquake registered at intensity 8.0 at the Modified Rossi-Forel Scale. The sample size was drawn using a multi-stage sampling design. From said provinces, the study randomly selected the sample cities and towns from where the sample barangays were subsequently taken. There were two sample cities and five sample towns. The two sample cities were Baguio of Benguet and Dagupan of Pangasinan. The sample towns were the following: La Trinidad of Benguet, Agoo and Aringay of La Union, and Calasio and Malasiqui of Pangasinan.

From the cities, 30 sample barangays were drawn and from the towns, 22 barangays. From a total of 52 barangays, 109 sample households were taken and were distributed as follows: 53 city households (40 in Baguio and 13 in Dagupan) and 56 town households (22 from urban and 34 from rural barangays). The sample size, from towns and cities to the households, was determined at 95 percent reliability with maximum sampling error of 10 percent.

The study conducted in-depth interviews in the 48 sample barangays. The interviews were administered to barangay leaders and other persons who were key participants in community activities undertaken to ensure the well-being of the members in a disaster situation. A set of questions was prepared beforehand to guide the interviews.

SITE OF THE STUDY

The study site is located in the northwestern part of Luzon Island at approximately 15° 5′ latitude in the North and 120° 5′ longitude in the East (Fig. 1). It covers three adjacent provinces with varying topographic and geologic characteristics. Because of these physical variations, different geologic hazards were created by the earthquake. There were landslides in Benguet and parallel and subparallel ruptures in La Union and Pangasinan. In some areas of Pangasinan, liquefaction took place. Being a densely populated area, these geologic hazards threatened so many lives.

The 1990 population density in the three provinces was 303 persons per square kilometer while the national density was only 202 persons4. The population in cities was more dense than in the towns. Baguio City had 183,102 persons (3,744 per square kilometer) and Dagupan City had 122,247 persons (2,801 per square kilometer). The two cities combined had a population density of 3,300 persons per square kilometer. In contrast, the towns had an average population of 55,845 persons or a density of only 648 persons per square kilometer. Such density was 2,652 less than that of the cities but more than three times greater than the national density.

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

Using the data gathered, the study reconstructs the situation during and immediately after the earthquake. The discussion covers the following aspects: awareness and outright response to the seismic hazard, impact of the earthquake and the survival strategies implemented at the household level, impact of the earthquake and community-based mitigating measures, mobilization of the household and community resources, and sourcing and sharing of external resources. From the discussion of each topic, the study culls the lessons which may serve as experience- based input to the preparation of a disaster preparedness and mitigation measures. Such input is part of the effort to come out with measures which are not only suited to the needs of the households and communities but also within their capability to put to work.

Awareness and Outright Response to the Seismic Hazard

The earthquake which struck Northern Luzon at 4:26 (Daylight Saving Time) in the afternoon of 16 July 1990 was never expected by the respondents. This was because 96 percent of them were fully unaware that their residence was located in an earthquake-prone area (Table 1). The very low level of awareness among the respondents on the geologic hazard in the area cuts across place of residence, income status, degree of mass media (radio and newspaper) exposure and frequency of attendance of community meetings.

Such awareness level is unlikely considering that the respondents had a high mass media exposure and frequently attended barangay meetings. Close to 95 percent of them owned a radio and listened to it almost daily (28 days a month). Half of them were regular newspaper readers although most of these readers were in the cities (71 percent) rather than in the towns (27 percent). However, there were more community meeting participants in the towns (89 percent) than in the cities (57 percent). This means that while in cities, the information provided by the radio was supplemented by the print media, in the towns, it was supplemented by community meetings. But whether in cities or in towns, the number of community meetings participated in by the respondents averaged only three times a year.

The very low awareness of the respondents on their seismic risk, despite their high mass media exposure and community meeting participation, points out one fact: the absence of a systematic effort to disseminate information on the physical hazards existing in the area. Such absence is further indicated by the source of information of the respondents who were aware that the area is a exposed to seismic risk. Half of them learned it from their old folks while the other half, from their neighbors. Because all sources are informal, none of them obtained the information from formal sources such as the mass media and public officials.

Being mostly unaware of the seismicity in the area, all the respondents were panic-stricken upon sensing the earthquake. The earthquake caught 82 percent of them indoors and 18 percent outdoors. Among those who were indoors, 71 percent were inside their houses. The rest were in their work places or some public buildings. They did not react to the earthquake in a similar manner: 57 percent ran somewhere and 43 percent stayed put. Most of those who ran wanted to get out from the enclosed structures where they were. However, those who were caught indoors reacted in almost the same way with 96 percent of them staying put in where they were. Being in their yards or in the farms or in the streets, they really had nowhere to run to. Except for one respondent, none of them reported a purposive reaction such as putting off the main electrical switch or moving under the door beam. The absence of such reactions merely indicates their lack of knowledge on the appropriate actions to be done in such a situation.

Impact of the Earthquake and Survival Strategies Implemented at the Household Level

The impact of the earthquake on man-made structures resulted to the disruption of the normal lives of the sample households. The extent of the disruption created is reflected in the problems confronting the households immediately after the earthquake. Nearly all the problems pertained to basic necessities: shelter, water, food, fuel, mobility, rescue services and income sources. Being basic necessities, the solutions to these problems meant the survival of the members of the households.

Need for Shelter and Its Solutions. The earthquake affected 84 percent of the houses of the sample households (Table 2). It indiscriminately wrecked houses regardless of its location and the owner’s income status. The percentage of houses which were destroyed was about the same whether in the cities or towns (85 vs. 84 percent) and whether in the highland or lowland (82 vs. 86 percent). This indicates that the landslides in the highland (Benguet) was just as destructive as the ruptures and liquefaction in the lowlands ( Pangasinan and La Union). It also destroyed 83 percent of the houses of the rich and 84 percent of the poor. The rich were the ones earning more than P4,998 per month (average income of the sample households in 1989) while the poor were the ones earning less. However, the earthquake was more considerate to houses made of light than of durable materials. There were more houses made of bamboo, grass and palm leaves which withstood the impact of the earthquake than those made of cement and galvanized iron (67 vs. 88 percent).

Among the earthquake-affected hoses, 89 Percent were partially destroyed and 11 percent totally collapsed. The damage sustained by those which were partially destroyed ranged from cracks in the walls and floor (38 Percent) to collapse of certain parts of the, structure (7 percent). Some 1 Percent of the houses remained intact but were dislocated from their original position. The distribution of houses by type of damage sustained in cities was largely the same as that in towns. However, there were more houses in cities which totally collapsed than in the towns (15 vs. 7 percent). Part of the explanation was the fact that there were more houses made of durable materials in the cities than in the towns (91 vs. 70) percent).

Because of the damage on housing structures, the need for shelter was the most widespread problem that emerged immediately after the earthquake. Such need was reported by 50 percent of the sample households or 34 percent less than the percentage of those with damaged houses. One reason is that in spite of the damage, some houses were still deemed by the households safe for habitation. Another is that temporary shelter was easily provided by one’s neighbor and relatives. Because the kinship network was stronger in towns than in cities, the need for shelter was confronted by more city than town residents (60 vs. 39 percent). In fact, 44 percent of those in need for shelter in the towns took refuge in their neighbors or relative’s house but none did the same in the cities.

Instead, most city residents chose to either construct a temporary shelter (40 percent) or transfer to an evacuation area (34 percent). Only 17 percent of the town households did the former and 11 percent did the latter. Besides, many town households were hesitant to leave their houses for fear that it might be burglarized or their animals might get lost in their absence. Thus, those who evacuated either left one male member behind to watch their belongings or stayed in their house during the day and in the evacuation center during the night.

There were about the same percentage of households in cities (26 percent) and municipalities (28 percent) who repaired their houses right after the earthquake to make these households habitable. However, the restoration of houses for normal occupancy may take sometime because only 36 percent of the sample households did it six months after the earthquake. The restoration went faster in the cities where 47 percent of the households had already done it. In contrast, only 25 percent of the town did the same. The main factor behind the uneven rate of housing restoration was the cost. The average amount spent by those who had already restored their houses was P36,674. The cost was higher in the cities (P40,930) than in the towns (P25,625) but the earnings of the city households was three times of the earnings of town households (P7,450 vs. P2,452 per month). Moreover, the cities had more rich households than the towns (73 vs. 27 percent) just as the towns had more poor households than the cities. Because of their greater capability, there were more rich households who completed the restoration of their houses than poor households (56 vs. 30 percent).

The households who had not yet restored their damaged houses, likewise, pinpointed the cost as the reason. The average restoration cost of P36,674 was equivalent to a seven or eight months earnings of the sample households whose average income was P4,874 per month. Even the rich had to save their entire income for six months (P9,248 per month) to come up with the average restoration cost of their houses (P51,949). The houses of the poor households had much lower restoration cost (P6,125) representing only their three-month income (P2,182 per month). This lower cost was borne out by the lower cost they spent for housing materials and labor. Most materials which they used for the restoration of their houses were gathered from nearby brushland (timber, bamboo and thatch grass) and swampland (nipa leaves and mangrove timber). The labor was readily provided by their kinsmen and neighbors. By using the resources of their immediate environment and the capability of an informal workgroup, 1.5 percent of the poor households even managed to reconstruct their houses without any financial outlay.

Problems an Water, Food, Fuel, Mobility and Rescue Services and Their Solutions. The problems on water, food, fuel, mobility and rescue services were mainly a result of the breakdown of the network of private and public services as a result of the earthquake. The damage on water and electric plants, farms and factories, roads and ports, pipe and wire lines disconnected all the distribution systems which supported population centers and linked these centers to each other. Because basic necessities in cities and towns were largely provided by said network and its breakdown occurred at a time of emergency when its services were most needed, multiple problems were felt by the households.

The foremost of these was the shortage of water and food. Water was a problem of 49 percent of the sample households and food was a problem of 47 percent (Table 3). Both problems were felt more in the cities than in the towns. In cities, the households who were in need of water comprised 66 percent (vs. 32 percent. in towns) and those in need of food comprised 49 percent (vs. 45 percent in towns). There was a smaller percentage of town households who ran short of water because many of them were still using the, traditional sources such as piped and dug wells, springs and streams. Although the ground ruptures generated by the earthquake dried up car degraded some of these water sources, others remained undisturbed, In contrast, more city households drew their water from individual household connection provided by local water supply systems.

When the operation of these water supply systems was halted by the earthquake, 43 percent of the affected households looked to the traditional water sources as alternative. These water sources which became obsolete at the advent of the individual household connection were again put to use. Some households walked a kilometer or two to get to these sources. Where such sources were not available or no longer useful, 38 percent turned to rain which was abundant at that time being a monsoon season. They gathered rainwaters from rooftops or through plastic sheets. In city centers where there were no traditional water sources and rain water difficult to gather, the households exercised their claim-matting functions by nudging government authorities for water rations.

The percentage of households who felt the shortage of food did not widely vary between cities and towns. However, the nature of their problem varied. In the cities, there was a general scarcity of all kinds of food but in the towns, it was limited to certain food stuffs. The vegetable-growing households in Benguet mainly ran short of rice and fish while the fishing households in La Union were in need only of rice. The inland households of Pan- and La Union had enough rice but did not have fish, sugar and salt. To meet their need, 98 percent of the households sought it from various sources: relatives, neighbors, stores, community leaders, governmental and non-governmental agencies. The need for food was one problem which prompted most households to enlist outside assistance. This means that the problem was beyond their capability to solve. Only 2 percent of the sample households had stock of the necessary food stuff which they rationed for two days.

Smaller percentages of sample households encountered problems on fuel (34 percent), mobility (5 percent) and rescue services (3 percent). Like the need for shelter, water and food, the problems on fuel and mobility burdened more city than town households. The lack of fuel was felt by 45 percent of the city households but only 23 percent of the town households. Mobility was needed by 8 percent of the city households but only 2 percent of the town households. The higher percentage of city households with problems on fuel and transport again indicated their greater dependence on public utilities such as electricity and mass transport. The town households relied more on kerosene and firewoods for fuel. Their need for mobility was also minimal because their food requirement was not wholly provided by the market and their travel destinations were usually accessible by foot or by nonmotorized transport modes.

Nonetheless, most sample households handled the problems of fuel and mobility on their own. For fuel, 79 percent scoured for candles and firewoods or made kerosene lamps for lighting. Firewoods were also used for cooking in place of electricity and gas. The rest elevated the problem to their community. They worked with their community leaders for the restoration of electric power supply in their respective areas. Among those who were in need of transport, 94 percent learned to use their foot. The rest who were vehicle owners limited the use of their vehicles to emergency and vital errands.

There were few sample households (3 percent) with members who were injured by the earthquake or were missing. These households rushed the injured members to the nearby hospital with the assistance of their neighbors or monitored both radio and word-of-mouth reports to locate the missing members. Thus in both cases, the sample households mobilized themselves to solved their own problems.

Destruction of Income Sources and Its Solutions. Based on the income sources of the sample households, the economy of the study site can be considered highly diversified. But the main source was salaries and wages supporting 71 percent of the sample households (Table 4). The dependence of the city households on this income source was much greater than of the town households (97 vs. 64 percent). Although an average household in the study site had two income sources, the portion derived from salaries and wages composed 55 percent of their average income.

In cities, business was next to salaries and wages as the income source providing for most households while in the towns, it was farming. Business was an income source of 54 percent of the city households (vs. 26 percent in towns) and contributed 27 percent of their average income (vs. 23 percent in towns). Meanwhile, farming supported 39 percent of the town households (vs. 6 percent in cities) and accounted for 20 percent of their average income (vs. 1 percent in cities). Other income sources in the study sites were remittances, livestock and poultry, pensions, rentals from properties and fishing. The average household earned P4,998 per month in 1989 or higher than the 1988 national average of P3,36.4 4 in the rest of the country, city households earned more then the town households (P 7,450 vs. P2,452).

The earthquake put the economy of the study site at a standstill and disrupted the operation a f the income sources of 56 percent of the sample households, The percentage of households affected was greater in cities than in toms (63 vs. 49 percent, in the highland than in the lowland (77 vs. 44 percent) and among the rich households than among the poor (60 vs. 54 percent). In terms of income source, it hit most severely the households earning from salaries send wages, affecting 36 percent of them, More salary and wage earners suffered in cities than in towns (54 vs. 20 percent), indicating once again the greater vulnerability of urban centers tea the earthquake, The impact of the earthquake on the farming households was not as extensive with only 16 percent of them being affected. Households relying can other income sources were also affected but only to a small extent: 5 percent among livestock and poultry raisers and 6 percent among property lessors.

Nonetheless, the rehabilitation of tire work places of salary and wage earners seemed to be the most swift. Six months after the earthquake, 62 percent of the affected salary and wage earners were, already back to normal work. The rehabilitation of the work places of the rest of the affected wage and salary earners took more time due to the greater damage sustained, the higher cost of rehabilitation and the degree of effort exerted by those concerned. Most of these were in cities where only 54 percent of the salary and wage earners returned to normal work after six months. In towns where the percentage of affected salary and wage earners was smaller, 82 percent were already working under normal conditions after the same period.

The rehabilitation of farmlands was also relatively swift with 59 percent of the farming households back to normal operation after six months. The rehabilitation was again faster in the towns than in the cities. In towns, 66 percent of the farming households were already operating normally six months after the earthquake while in cities, only 40 percent did the same. Among the livestock and poultry raisers and among property lessors, less than half had normal operation after six months: 40 percent among livestock arid poultry raisers and 43 percent among property lessors.

However, only 13 percent of the affected households were involved in the rehabilitation of their income sources. None of those who did were salary and wage earners because they placed the entire burden of rehabilitating their work places on their employers. Having two income sources, the average household depended on the other source while waiting for the normalization of the operation of their work places. Those with only one income source put up small-scale business enterprises (such as vending and candy making) or secured loans to tide them over while still unemployed.

However, the farming households immediately cleared their land of boulders or drained it of flood waters one or two weeks after the earthquake and resumed cultivation. Those whose lots could not be immediately rehabilitated, farmed other portions of their lands. Two fishpond-owners restocked their ponds with fingerlings two weeks after the earthquake, spurted warm water and decimated all their fish stocks. But for some fishermen, the resumption of their livelihood generation activities were affected by the long-term effect of the earthquake. In Barangay Carael, Dagupan City, the fishermen reported of the sudden depletion of fish in the river. Two varieties of small shellfish (damisil and kakayat) were said to have proliferated and were consuming the algae which served as fish food.

Impact of the Earthquake and Community-based Mitigating Measures

The impact generated by the earthquake at the household level became a community concern when it turned out to have affected a considerable number of households and a common solution was sought out by these households. These solutions were worked out and implemented by the community through a cooperative effort between members and leaders. Existing community organizations usually served the catalyst of community mobilization. The diversity and creativity of the solutions varied in spite of the similarity of the problems.

Food Shortage and its Mitigating Measures. Among these problems which inspired community-level solutions was food shortage which swept through all the 46 communities covered by the study (Table 5). These communities solicited food relief from governmental and non-governmental agencies. This measure indicated that these communities have little food in reserve and needed outside assistance for contingency. Nonetheless, 11 communities ensured that such assistance was used in a manner considered most desirable by the community members by operating a communal kitchen. But in one community, the members themselves were the ones who contributed the food for the communal kitchen.

The community kitchen was managed either by entire community or by a neighborhood. In this kitchen, the donated food stuff was prepared by the community members and was subsequently distributed according to certain criteria agreed upon. This measure safeguarded the donated food stuff from pilferage and placed its manner of distribution above suspicion. The community kitchens operated for an average of four days. Afterwards, uncooked food was simply distributed to the individual households through a certain system. Contributing to the closure of the community kitchen was the mob of non-community members who requested for a share and reduced the amount of food for the community members. There was also a realization that a communal kitchen was difficult to maintain in communities with scattered housing distribution. This was because the community members found it too tedious to walk a certain distance to take their meals.

While all communities received food assistance from outside, some communities carried out measures which enabled its internal food distribution network to operate normally in a crisis situation. In 6 communities, arrangements were made with store owners to continue selling goods at pre-earthquake prices until their supply ran out. The stores which closed before its stock was depleted were reprimanded by the community members. In 3 of these communities, the stores were prohibited to jack up the prices of their wares. The members of 3 other communities pooled together some money and bought certain food items from wholesalers. In this manner, they obtained the food items at prices lower than those quoted by the retailers whowere their usual suppliers. Through such measure, the community spared itself from the sudden increases of prices which occurred immediately after the earthquake. In one community, the members through their leaders secured three-day credit from market vendors for those who were left homeless by the earthquake.

The conduct of these measures implied that the food shortage which occurred after the earthquake was not so much due to the lack of food but to its inability to reach the consumers. In fact, vegetables were rotting in Irisan, Baguio City just as fish were left untransported in the some coastal barangays of Agoo, La Union. Nonetheless, a widespread hunger was prevented by communities after the earthquake through measures which somehow managed to move food to where the demand was without using of the normal food routes.

Water Shortage and its Mitigating Measures. Another problem which prompted the communities to use its initiative was the water shortage felt in 46 communities or 96 percent of the total. The shortage came about when springs dried up, water pipes were busted, wells were contaminated, water supply systems halted operation and rivers, streams and irrigation canals were diverted. In 20 communities, nothing was done to mitigate the water shortage for two reasons. One was that the members managed it at the household level because either collective action failed to evolve or no need was seen for it. Another was that the water shortage was beyond the capability of the communities to handle such as the case of those in Pangasinan and La Union which went completely underwater.

Nonetheless, 26 communities or 57 percent of those undergoing water shortage mitigated the problem at the community level. In 13 communities, an inventory of the various water sources and their regular users was immediately done after the earthquake. The community leaders subsequently arranged with the users of those water sources which remained serviceable to share these with the users of water sources which were rendered useless by the earthquake. In one community, the use of private water tanks owned by its more affluent members was shared with the rest through rationing. In 9 communities where the earthquake impaired all regular water sources, new ones were developed by digging wells and improving access to existing springs. In 2 of these communities, pump wells which were disfunctional for years were repaired. The only recourse of 4 other communities in urban centers was to press their local fire department and other concerned agencies (such as the Local Water Utilities Authority) for periodic water delivery.

Electric Power Shortage and its Mitigating Measures. As it ceased the operation of power stations, toppled power posts and cut power lines, the earthquake deprived 46 communities, or 96 percent of the total, of electricity. In some communities, the absence of electric power took only three days whiles in others, it was as long as 60 days. The restoration of electric power took tinge particularly in 16 flooded communities. Among tire communities which were left without electricity, 31 communities fully left tire task of its restoration to the, concerned agencies. This wars the situation in communities where electricity returned shortly and in the ones which were largely depopulated by evacuation. Massive evacuation occurred in areas along the sea sand rivers where the earthquake brought about widespread flooding.

The outright result of the loss of electricity wars tire shortae of fuel for lighting and cooking. Sonic 10 communities coped with the shortage by using substitutes materials for fuel. Days after the earthquake, tire members of these communities camped in open spaces using firewoods for cooking and lighting. The firewoods were easily gathered in communities where there were standing woodlots. In communities where there were none, discarded lumber materials and old tires were collected from among the members. In tire evening, the bonfires made out of these materials lighted anal warmed their evacuation places. The restoration of electric power was hastened in 5 communities by work teams formed by their members. Working in coordination with the personnel of electric companies, these work teams reinstalled the power, post and removed the felled trees which cut the power lines. In one community where the electric company could not send a personnel, the restoration work was supervised by a community member who was an electrical engineer.

Demand for shelter its Mitigating Measures. The extensive damae of housing structures in 32 communities made shelter a serious concern. These communities comprised 67 percent of tire total. As the aftershocks kept on corning, more rnembers of these communities stayed out from the remaining standing houses and increased the demand for shelter. To meet the demand, various community-level measures were undertaken. Putting up common shelter was undertaken in 13 communities, These shelters were made of assorted materials gathered by the members in their own communities. Plastic sheets used as roofing of delivery trucks were made into tents and galvanized iron from damaged houses were made into leantos. Blankets, sacks and curtains were sewn together and palm leaves were woven into materials for temporary shelters. In one community, its leaders went from house to house to search for canvass tents. More materials were used by one community where monetary contribution wars solicited from among its members. Using such contribution, the community bought nails and timber.

To reduce the number of those in need of shelter, community-organized work teams repaired damaged houses in communities. The repair made many houses habitable although these may not be restored to their old forms. In 10 communities, the selection of evacuation sites were decided collectively. By publicly weighing the positive and negative features of each sites, the members’ intimate knowledge of their own environment served as basis of the decision. While the process ensured the acceptability of the selected site, it also oriented the community members on the ways the resources and the constraints of the evacuation site can be managcd. In one community, the demand for shelter was relieved through an arrangement which enabled persons who were left homeless to stay with those whose houses were spared by the earthquake. Such arrangement was brokered by community leaders.

Road Closure/ Transport Shortage and Mitigating Measures. The earthquake caused the complete or partial isolation of 30 communities comprising 63 percent of the total. The transport lines which were lifelines to these communities were cut by landslides, ground ruptures and floods. Complete isolation meant that the land routes or waterways linking the community to the town or city centers became impassable while partial isolation meant part of it could not be reached from the community center. Because the communities relied on the town and city centers for a wide range of goods and services just as the population clusters within these communities relied on their centers, such isolation was easily translated into shortages. The need to restore the transport lines became more urgent as injuries and deaths occurred among community members.

To break the isolation, all the communities immediately organized work groups to clear the roads blocks. Using manual tools, these work groups removed felled trees and earth debris. Big boulders were removed in two communities through bulldozers and cranes borrowed from construction companies operating in their vicinity. Where there was no such equipment available, 5 communities gave up on road clearing and instead, opened alternative routes. This option involved the negotiation for a right-of-way and removal of obstructions such as fences and standing trees. In one community, P 10.00 was collected from every public transport vehicle who passed through the partially repaired roads to finance the remaining work required.

In three communities where the roads shortly became passable, isolation remained due to the absence of public transport. The public transport operators refused to ply in their usual routes because of the scarcity of gasoline. In response, a transport pool of private vehicles was created in two communities. The community members registered in advance their errands so that a trip to the city center carrying out all the errands could be planned. This reduced to a minimum the number of trips done by the community members. In one community where there were no private vehicles, an arrangement was made with a group of jeepney owners to provide one round trip to the city center once a day. The schedule of the trip was announced beforehand and the jeepney owners took turns in providing the vehicle.

Flooding and its Mitigating Measures. The flooding which occurred in 16 communities or 33 percent of the total was a result of various factors: liquefaction, diversion of waterways, obliteration of natural water gullies and the monsoon rains. Two or three of these factors worked in combination in all communities which were flooded. But flooding was intermittent and sectional in some communities while in others, it was continuous and extensive. In the latter communities, the water forced most members to evacuate. It was only after the water subsided that the evacuees resettled in these communities.

However, 10 communities undertook measures, 9 of which organized work teams who constructed canals to direct the flow of waters. The canals drained flood waters from evacuation sites and from routes to vital locations. These locations included water sources, health centers and gateways to city or town centers. Several days after the earthquake, the members of one community constructed an embankment to reduce the volume of water spilled from the river. The earthquake triggered the spillage and flooded the community.

Health and Sanitation Problems and Their Mitigating Measures. The health situation in 7 communities or 15 percent of the total deteriorated after the earthquake. This was indicated by the increased incidence of sickness especially among children. The exposure to the elements, the use of water from sources open to contamination, the deficiency of the available health care and the improper disposal of wastes contributed to such deterioration. Among these communities, 4 implemented measures aimed at improving the prevailing health situation. One made up the lack of modern medicine and medical personnel by using medicinal plants for treatment. Wounds and boils were cleansed with the broth of guava leaves and rheumatism was administered with coffee and eucalyptus leaves. These were administered by community members who were knowledgeable on the medicinal application of the plants in their immediate environment in spite of the advent of modern medicine. Such traditional knowledge came in handy when modern medicine was not available.

Another local resource which became very useful to one community was limestone mined from a nearby quarry. It reportedly retarded the decomposition of the bodies of the three community members who died and prevented the spread of foul odor. The community also shared the mineral with a number of communities which dead members could not avail of embalming services or immediate burial. In three communities, the sanitation in the evacuation sites was improved by having work groups construct temporary toilets. The toilets were made mostly of recycled materials such as gasoline drums for waste container. The toilets ensured that human waste did not find their way to water sources.

Sourcing and Sharing of External Resources

Although the households and communities affected by the earthquake used their own initiative and resources, external assistance was also needed. Such assistance was provided by other households within the community and by governmental and non-governmental agencies operating outside the community. The procurement of such assistance from these agencies and its distribution among community members generated some problems. Nonetheless, the manner these problems were handled stimulated creativity and showed the ways household and community initiative and resources could be complemented by external donors.

Assistance-seeking Among the Households. The self-reliance of households and commnities during the post-earthquake situation is indicated by the fact that 46 percent of the sample households did not seek assistance from outside their own household. Such assistance was sought by the remaining 54 percent. The percentage of assistance-seekers did not vary by status. They constituted 53 percent among the rich and 54 percent among the poor (Table 6). But to a certain extent, the propensity to ask assistance was determined by the impact the earthquake had on the physical assets of the households. Close to 58 percent of those with damaged houses sought outside assistance. Only 38 percent did the same among the households whose houses were spared by the earthquake.

The households who sought assistance tried to secure it from various sources. But the source that received most request was the non-governmental organizations, particularly the Philippine National Red Cross. Close to 73 percent of the assistance seekers asked assistance from these organizations. The community leaders followed the non-governmental organizations whose assistance was sought out by 42 percent of the households. Less households made their request to governmental organizations: 35 percent to national government agencies and 8 percent to city/municipal and provincial officials. Those who called upon their relatives constituted only 10 percent in spite of the existence of strong kinship ties. This may be due to the fact that 97 percent of the assistance seekers were looking for food. But because the earthquake cut-off almost all households from their food sources, no one had food to share.

Nonetheless, the relatives and the community leaders beat the non-governmental and governmental organizations in responding to the call for assistance. The response of their relatives came after two days and that of their community leaders came after three days. In contrast, it took an average of one week and 2 days for the non-governmental organizations to respond and one week and 5 days for the national government agencies. Despite the relatively slow response, 96 percent of the households received assistance. The assistance largely came in the form of relief goods. Among those whose houses were damaged, only 6 percent received assistance for repairs. Such assistance was either a loan from the Government Security and Insurance System (GSIS) or an aid from Department of Social Work and Development (DSWD). Among the affected farming households, none received any assistance for the rehabilitation of their farmlands.

Giving of AssistanceAmong the Sample Households. The households in an earthquakeravaged situation did not only display assistance-seeking behavior. Some 30 percent of them managed to help other households. However, the households who shared their own resources had certain characteristics. Assistance was dispensed by 38 percent of the rich households but only 25 percent of the poor households. Indeed, the leaders in 5 communities were reported to have received generous donation from among their wealthy members. There were also more who shared resources among households with undamaged houses at 47 percent. Among those with damaged houses, only 28 percent provided some form of assistance.

Both characteristics of most assistance-providers indicated that such behavior was partly a result of the existence of a surplus. Such assistance was provided by 43 percent to other members of their community and by 37 percent to their relatives. Only 20 percent gave to complete strangers. Food was the assistance provided by 62 percent. Another 38 percent shared their shelter and 11 percent gave money. The providers of clothes composed 5 percent and the providers of medicine, 3 percent.

Assistance-seeking Among the Communities. All the 48 communities studied received some form of external assistance after the earthquake. On the average, the assistance arrived three days since the earthquake (Table 7). The nearer the location of the community to the city or town center, the swifter the arrival of the assistance. Thus, Engineers’ Hill which was adjacent to Baguio City center acquired said assistance four hours after the earthquake while Panganuan East in Aringay, La Union waited for four days. The waiting period was also stretched in communities which transport link with the city or town centers was cut by the earthquake. The communities received external assistance in two ways. One was through active procurement outside the community and another was through various entities who went to the communities to deliver such assistance. Active procurement occurred within two weeks after the earthquake. The delivery of relief assistance started four days after the earthquake and was still going on intermittently six months later.

There were 46 communities who actively search for external assistance after the earthquake. They went to the city and town centers to procure relief goods from the office of the mayor, the DSWD or some other governmental entities. In the process of procuring such assistance, 37 communities or 77 percent of the total encountered problems. All these problems were met at the source because these solely concerned the manner such assistance was given. The problem most frequently cited pertained to the lack of clear and definite location, procedures and requirements of relief procurement. This problem was cited by the leaders of 44 percent of the communities.

Most of the communities who had this problem were in Baguio City. This problem included the difficulty of locating the venue of relief distribution at a particular time and the confusion as to the step-by-step process needed for orderly and rapid dispersal of relief goods. At some points, certain documents (such as a household list) were reportedly made a prerequisite for acquisition of relief goods although the community leaders were not informed beforehand about such requirement. This further delayed the release of relief goods particularly to communities which were situated far from the center or which were rendered inaccessible to wheeled vehicles.

These uncertainties generated by the manner the relief goods was distributed to the communities were exacerbated by a host of other administrative problems. The leaders of 15 percent of the communities complained that while they were made to accomplish forms to obtain relief goods, the government personnel whose signatures were to be affixed in these forms were unavailable. In 9 percent of the communities, reports were made that their leaders competed with private individuals and non-governmental organizations in securing relief goods. In these communities, the leaders also reported that persons whom they did not know even procured relief by using their names. This situation occurred because there was no definite policy on who were authorized to obtain the goods from the distribution centers. Furthermore, no procedure was set on the proper identification of the legitimate representative of the community.

The leaders in 4 percent of the communities even made charges of discrimination in relief goods allocation. Such discrimination was purportedly based on kinship (relatives versus nonrelatives), ethnic strain (Lowlander versus Igorot) and political affiliation (Marcos versus Aquino follower). In one community, a leader said he was only able to speedily acquire relief goods for his constituency because a cousin manned the distribution center. The sum of these problems was the long wait in relief goods procurement as reported in 27 percent of the communities. Waiting for relief for as long as eight hours was reported in Baguio City.

Once the relief goods were released, transporting these from the town or city center to the community became a problem of 39 percent of the communities. The problem was easily handled by community leaders or members who owned vehicles. In communities where no vehicle was available, the community leaders rented one from the town or city center at usually very high rates. The rental was either paid out from the pocket of the community leaders or from the relief goods procured. The relief goods bound for communities which were not accessible by a wheeled vehicle or which roads were blocked by landslides or roadcuts were transported by work animals or by foot. This constraint delayed much more the arrival of the relief goods in the community. Upon arrival, the relief goods which were obtained at any one time were deemed in 9 percent of the communities as insufficient relative to the number of their households. Such insufficiency was reportedly borne out by the piecemeal manner the relief goods were released. .

However, a rationalization and streamlining of operation in distribution centers later mitigated many of these problems. In one town, the distribution of relief goods to the barangays was made in alphabetical order while in another, it was according to the barangay’s distance from the town center. In both towns, the assistance was divided beforehand among the barangays to hasten their release. One of these towns also made it a policy to release the allocation of the barangay only to its captain to avoid duplication. One city scheduled the distribution of relief goods to minimize the waiting time spent by the community leaders. When the schedule was changed for some reason, a city employee was sent to the barangay captain to inform him ahead of time. A town and a city also divided their various barangays into areas of responsibility, each of which was assigned to a councilman to look after.

Sharing of External Assistance Within Communities. Food was the relief goods that reached all the communities. Only 55 percent of the communities secured medicine (including water purifier tablets) and 15 percent received plastic sheets which could be used as tents. Blankets were obtained by 8 percent of the communities and money, by 6 percent. For relief goods brought in by community leaders through active procurement outside, a distribution system was put in place. This system was managed mainly by community leaders in 62 per cent of the communities. However, in 19 percent of the communities, said leaders worked in tandem with.youth organizations (such as 4-H clubs and basketball associations). In another 19 percent, women organizations (such as Mothers Club and La Union Ladies Association) actively manned the distribution system. One community issued an identification tag to those who helped in distribution so that any misdemeanor could be easily reported to the leaders.

The distribution system was either based on the barangay or on its subdivision called the sitio. In barangays where the houses were largely clustered near each other, the barangay center served as the base of operation. Where the houses were scattered far apart as isolated farmsteads, the community leaders decentralized the operation by giving each sitio the power to manage each own distribution system. Under this situation, the external assistance procured by the community leaders was allocated to the leaders of each sitio, who in turn, allocated it to their constituent households.

These distribution systems haphazardly evolved in the communities. Many initially distributed the external assistance they received to individuals who formed a single file in front of the barangay hall or the captain’s house. However, their leaders learned that this process favored the households with more members in the file and who were quick enough to run to the line whenever relief goods were available. The communities later implemented more rational assistance distribution systems some of which functioned better than others. These systems required in some communities the updating of their list of households to avoid duplication in distribution. One community opted to issue coupon to each household which must be presented and countersigned by the disbursing officer whenever its share of assistance was claimed.

There were two systems which were widely used: sectoral prioritization and equal distribution (Table 8). The sectoral prioritization distribution system was conceived and implemented in 54 percent of the communities. Under this system, external assistance was channeled directly to certain sectors of the community. The prioritized sectors varied among communities. In some communities, the evacuees obtained priority while in others, it was the indigents. In one community, the children and pregnant mothers were the prioritized sectors.

This system was well accepted in communities where the destruction of the earthquake was not widespread or where there was relatively wide gap between the rich and the poor. This was because those whose houses and livelihood sources-remained intact after the earthquake and those whose resource base was more than enough to replace the destroyed assets, did not look forward for such assistance: However, in five communities where most households were affected by the earthquake or which rich members were mere salaried employees, the system was considered as unjust. The core of the charge was the need for equal treatment among victims evacuees or non-evacuees, rich or poor, and displaced or non-displaced workers. The complainants maintained that every household was entitled to its share of any external assistance granted to the community regardless of their level of need. The rich in three communities rankled for a share of external assistance because their poorer relatives were in need.

Due to these complaints, some communities shifted to equal distribution system which
operated in 39 percent of the communities. This system worked in two arrangements. The
more widely used was the equal division among the households of any amount of external
assistance that reached the community. Under tires arrangement, the pre-packed bags containing anassortment of relief goods (such as rice, sardines milk and cooking oil) intended fear the consumption of care household was unpacked for distribution to all the households, household could hake home only a tin bean of rice or a tablespoon of cooking oil but no one had a bigger or smaller share than the other.

The other arrangement was adopted tea the fact that eternal assistance reached the community by batch and each itch was never enough for all the households. Thus, the leaders divided their community by segment and each was assigned as the beneficiary of a particular batch of assistance. Under this arrangement, the households received varying types of relief goods and bigger share, as compared to the ones under the first arrangement, rider both arrangements, goods, such as blankets and tents, which were too few to be divided among the households were given to certain sectors. For instance, nine community allocated the eight blankets it received to the elderly and mothers of new-born babies The 20 tents it received went try those who were left homeless try the earthquake.

By itself, the equal distribution of external assistance among households did not consider the varying level of need of the disaster victims. The system actually transferred to the household the power tea decide whether to share the assistance it received to the more needy. In five communities, a number of unaffected or rich households forewent their share in favor of the affected car the poor, But some of these; rich on unaffected households opted to get their share and gave it to their preferred beneficiaries,

Nonetheless, this system was criticized in four communities fear not taking into consideration the varying size of tire, households. Under both arrangements, the household with eight members obtained the same amount of assistance as the household eat only three members. One community made adjustment try using the number of pre-adolescent children in the household as basis in determining the amount of assistance that was allocated to it. Such action indicated that tire system underwent refinement as time went by to make it more suitable to the requirements of the community.

Two other systems were used lay a limited number of communities brat nevertheless served some purpose in their particular milieu. The house-to-house distribution system was used in only ease community. Such community had a small number of households who were living far apart front each other. Informing each household on the availability of external assistance took some tittle. Thus, the community leaders chose tea deliver the share of each to their respective house. The first-come-first served system operated in two communities. Except fear two dislocated water pipes, one was cart affected in anyway fry the earthquake, The other had affected households but they were generally affluent. Thus, the level of need for external assistance was low in both communities. To dispense the external assistance received by the community, its leaders simply give it away to any member who wanted some.

Issues in Distribution of Relief Assistance and Workable Strategies Regardless of the functioning of a distribution system used, there were issues which the community grappled with in managing external assistance. The issues which emerged in different communities indicated that the disaster situation in one community may be different from the rest. Nonetheless, not all communities confronting a particular issue were able to resolve it. But some communities were able to generate strategies which proved to be workable.

The first issue was how to guarantee the community leaders from suspicion of pilferage of external assistance obtained for the community. This issue arose in about half of the communities, most of which had relatively big population with factional groupings. But 10 communities formulated procedures to prevent such suspicion. These procedures required that upon arrival, the goods comprising the external assistance must be placed in a public building (schoolhouse, health unit or barangay hall) and must be distributed to the households before nightfall. Thus, the community leaders must alert beforehand the potential beneficiaries of the arrival of the external assistance.

The second issue was whether the external assistance obtained by the community should be shared with non-community members who were stranded or temporarily taking refuge. Five communities sheltered outsiders for about a week after the earthquake. These outsider were either students, mine workers and passer-bys who were trapped in the community by road closures or were evacuees from other communities. For those who were merely stranded, one community negotiated with its more affluent members to temporarily accommodate them until transportation was available. Some of these refugees were even provided transport fee by their hosts. However, the case of the evacuees was more controversial be cause sharing with them the community’s resources ignited resentment from the members One community resolved the issue by obtaining the services of the DSWD to take care o1 the evacuees who were taking refuge in its schoolhouse.

The third issue was what to do with an external assistance which did not respond to the needs of the community. One community received seeds of crops which were not suitable to the type of its soil. The seeds which may be useful to another community was simply wasted. Two communities received food assistance which they did not need. Because the earthquake occurred after the harvest season, one rice- growing community with enough rice-stock received rice from outside sources. The rice donation which were distributed to the members promptly found their way to the market. The other community was initially it need of food but the foodstuff kept on coming within six months after the earthquake. As a result, a number of community members halted the cultivation of their plots and learned to depend on the dole-outs. The dependence that the external-assistance developed, by itself became a community problem.

The fourth issue was whether governmental and non-governmental organizations be allowed to directly distribute assistance to the households and bypass the existing community distribution system. Thirty-nine communities who were visited by these organizations allowed them to provide direct assistance and some even provided them with list of households. However, these organizations managed only to reach a portion of the community members, many of whom were living along the roadside. Because of the uneven benefit that these visits provide, resentment developed between the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries and between the community members and their leaders. One community, charged its leaders of putting only selected names in the list of households provided to these organizations. Another community had households who managed to wring so much goods from external donors that they were able to sell some of these to their neighbors. In three communities, the non-beneficiaries sought to off-set their loss by obtaining more from the existing distribution system. But being dependent on external sources, the system could not match the assistance provided by the more resource-rich governmental and non-governmental organizations.

Uneven direct provision of assistance from outside may also build dangerous expectations among the non-beneficiaries. The case in point is the housing assistance provided by the government. Totally destroyed houses were found in 24 communities. But six months after the earthquake, there were only 3 communities where all the owners of the damaged house got housing assistance. No one obtained assistance in 6 communities. In 15 communities, assistance was given to some but not to all owners of damaged houses. For example, only 6 out of 12 obtained housing assistance in Pinget, Baguio City and 19 out of 49 in Santa Barbara, Agoo in La Union. Those who did not get the housing assistance nagged their community leaders. Some secured debt for house construction with the expectation that it can be repaid by the government housing assistance. Six months after the earthquake, such assistance did not yet come. This left the houseowner with a debt the interest of which grew day by day. Thus, the direct administration of external assistance can shred not only the cohesion of the community bound together by a common effort to survive but also the wellbeing of an individual.

SOME CONCLUDING NOTES

The study established that the households in the study sites were unaware that they were living in a geologically risky area and were unprepared for the July 1990 earthquake. Nonetheless, they responded to its impact through collective effort and by making use of available resources within their environment. Through such effort, road blocks were cleared, houses were repaired, services were restored and lives were saved. The resources in their environment readily substituted the conveniences of modern living — herbs instead of manufactured medicine, spring water instead of tap water, bonfires instead of electric lights and lime deposit instead of chemical preservatives for the dead. The communities who managed to have these resources were less dependent on external assistance. Their collective effort and creative- use of available resources ensured their survival and the restoration of their former lifeways in spite of the failure of the governmental and non-governmental organizations to provide an immediate response.

Notwithstanding, most households and communities sought external assistance. The procurement of such assistance was encumbered by the administrative shortcomings in distribution centers and lack of transportation. But once the goods comprising the assistance reached the community, these were distributed according to some systems which the community evolved through trial and error. The distribution systems varied among communities but generally worked to uphold their members’ concept of fairness. However, some governmental and non-governmental organizations later directly distributed their assistance to some community members. By bypassing the community distribution system, a number of undesirable consequences resulted. The most grave was the weakening of the cohesion of the community which should hold together more steadfastly at such a time.

The experience of the households and communities of Northern Luzon indicated that they have the capability to manage a disaster situation. This capability was exercised in a haphazard manner mainly because of their unpreparedness for the disaster. It, nonetheless, produced workable strategies for disaster mitigation which were tailored to needs of the community. These strategies can serve as basis for a disaster mitigation program with the community as the centerpiece. The program can strengthen both the organizational and environmental capability of the community. It will also ensure that the effort of governmental and non-governmental organizations should merely supplement but not supplant that of the community. In this manner, the capability of the community to rely on itself will propel it not only to survive in a disaster situation but also move forward in normal times.

SOME CONCLUDING NOTES

The study established that the households in the study sites were unaware that they were living in a geologically risky area and were unprepared for the July 1990 earthquake. Nonetheless, they responded to its impact through collective effort and by making use of available resources within their environment. Through such effort, road blocks were cleared, houses were repaired, services were restored and lives were saved. The resources in their environment readily substituted the conveniences of modern living — herbs instead of manufactured medicine, spring water instead of tap water, bonfires instead of electric lights and lime deposit instead of chemical preservatives for the dead. The communities who managed to have these resources were less dependent on external assistance. Their collective effort and creative- use of available resources ensured their survival and the restoration of their former lifeways in spite of the failure of the governmental and non-governmental organizations to provide an immediate response.

Notwithstanding, most households and communities sought external assistance. The procurement of such assistance was encumbered by the administrative shortcomings in distribution centers and lack of transportation. But once the goods comprising the assistance reached the community, these were distributed according to some systems which the community evolved through trial and error. The distribution systems varied among communities but generally worked to uphold their members’ concept of fairness. However, some governmental and non-governmental organizations later directly distributed their assistance to some community members. By bypassing the community distribution system, a number of undesirable consequences resulted. The most grave was the weakening of the cohesion of the community which should hold together more steadfastly at such a time.

The experience of the households and communities of Northern Luzon indicated that they have the capability to manage a disaster situation. This capability was exercised in a haphazard manner mainly because of their unpreparedness for the disaster. It, nonetheless, produced workable strategies for disaster mitigation which were tailored to needs of the community. These strategies can serve as basis for a disaster mitigation program with the community as the centerpiece. The program can strengthen both the organizational and environmental capability of the community. It will also ensure that the effort of governmental and non-governmental organizations should merely supplement but not supplant that of the community. In this manner, the capability of the community to rely on itself will propel it not only to survive in a disaster situation but also move forward in normal times.

REFERENCES

Caroll, John J. and Salvador A. Parco. 1966. Social Organization in a Crisis Situation: The Taal Disaster. Manila: Philippine Sociological Society.

National Statistics Office. 1990. Statistical Handbook of the Philippines. Manila.

Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator. Disaster Prevention and Mitigation: A Compendium of Current Knowledge. Social and Sociological Aspects. Vol. 12. Geneva.

Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology. 1985. Environmental Impact Study of the 1984 Mayon Volcano Eruption. Unpublished Report. Quezon City.